Members of parliament are privileged agents. They can choose who to regard as their principal: the entire nation, a particular electoral district or a political party. Focusing on two countries with mixed electoral systems, Romania and Hungary, the article documents the dominance of the electoral logic of role-formation over the constraints of legislative organisation and the influence of socialisation. The focus of representation is found to be only modestly influenced by the degree of the embeddedness of MPs in political structures and hierarchies. The association of the seat with a particular territorial unit, on the other hand, has a robust effect even when this association originates in the political environment and not in formal rules. Finally, the psychological effect of losing a Single Member District is also found to influence how MPs perceive their representative role.
providing the researcher with a convenient quasi-experimental design. The logic of territorial-based and party-based electoral systems is not perfectly replicated within mixed systems since the different electoral channels interact in affecting the strategic considerations of voters, parties and candidates (Ferrara, Herron, & Nishikawa, 2005) , but precisely because of the existence of this 'contamination effect' mixed systems present a demanding test for the claims concerning the differences between the differently constructed parliamentary mandates.
Mixed systems specifically allow for the comparison between representatives acting according to list logic or district logic. Most evidently the two groups can be distinguished by the nature of their seats, that is, how they have been elected. Different types of seat are associated with differences in campaign experience and with different expectations from the environment, from fellow politicians and from voters. One of the central questions of the article is whether the experiences collected as candidates overshadow the motivations stemming from holding different kinds of seat. In other words, do the party-list MPs differ from the district MPs because they have different seats or because they were different candidates? Furthermore, even if the different orientation of MPs elected according to different rules is documented, one may still wonder about the nature of the causal mechanism. Are the differences due to formal procedures, for example, or could a simple informal association between an MP and a geographically bounded constituency generate distinct principal-agent perceptions?
In order to answer these questions the article examines two countries, Hungary and Romania, which are similar to the extent that they employ mixed member electoral systems but differ in the degree to which the type of candidacy and the nature of the seat are institutionalised. By focusing on these cases two different logics of mixing majoritarian and proportional rules can be investigated. In Hungary some candidates are exclusively list candidates while others are present in both channels. 1 In Romania all politicians run as Single Member District (SMD) candidates, and only the logic of seat allocation divides them into two groups. The law assigns a district to all MPs, the district where they were candidates, but only the candidates receiving an absolute majority of votes gain the seat directly. The others win the seat thanks to the aggregation of party votes at county and national levels (Chiru & Ciobanu, 2009) . One can become the MP of a particular district while still receiving many times fewer votes than the competitor. There are no legally defined differences between the seats, but the political environment treats those who actually obtained the support of the district differently from those who have not. Therefore the difference between more and less district-bound MPs is relevant also in the Romanian case. But it is important to keep in mind that the division of MPs into more or less district-bound categories materialises in the two countries in different forms.
The characteristics of the chosen cases also allow us to differentiate between the parliamentary logic, which implies that an MP should think and behave according to the nature of the seat, and the electoral logic, which implies that the focus of representation should depend on the nature of the campaign, particularly as far as dependence on the nominating party is concerned. While many politicians are aware during the campaigns of what sort of seats they may end up with, some are bound to be surprised once all the votes are counted. In Hungary politicians may consider themselves primarily as SMD candidates, yet end up with a list seat. In Romania a candidate may be confident enough to plan an outright victory of the district, and yet may finish holding the seat simply due to the popularity of his or her party in the region or nationwide. The contrast between the two groups can help us discern which of the above-listed two logics is more powerful.
The empirical material used in the analysis is based on two surveys conducted in 2010. In Hungary 241 MPs were interviewed, 62.7 per cent of all the deputies, as part of the Hungarian Candidate Study (Enyedi, 2010) . The Romanian parliamentary sample (Stefan, 2010 ) is based on self-administered questionnaires: 170 members of the Chamber of Deputies (50.6 per cent) participated in the survey.
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As can be seen from the two parts of Table A2 in the Appendix, the completed samples are highly representative of the MP populations with respect to incumbency, gender and party affiliation. The content of the two surveys overlapped but they also differed in many regards. The Hungarian study was conducted directly after the election and contained a long battery of questions on campaigning.
3 The Romanian study was a mid-term study, asking a number of questions on the practice of representation, including the emphasis on constituency work. The two studies complement each other: in the Hungarian case we can find out whether the style of campaigns and the incentives stemming from the electoral arena shape the embraced roles; the Romanian dataset allows us to investigate whether the different roles also imply differences in the actual parliamentary work.
At the time of the surveys the Romanian party system was characterised by the dominance of two large parties, PSD (Social Democratic Party) and PDL (Democratic Liberal Party), closely followed by a mid-sized party, the PNL (National Liberal Party). The premiership and the presidency were in the hands of PDL, but the government commanded only a narrow majority. In contrast to Romania, Hungary was undergoing a major party system transformation in 2010. The previously ruling MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party) suffered a humiliating defeat at the parliamentary election, the right-wing Fidesz won two-thirds of the seats, and the radical right Jobbik gained almost as much support as the MSZP (Batory, 2010) . Virtually all single member seats were taken by Fidesz and therefore the analysis of SMD representatives will actually mean an analysis of Fidesz MPs. 4 The following section of the article outlines those theoretical models of role formation that informed our research and presents the main variables and hypotheses associated with them. The subsequent section includes a brief validation of our dependent variable. Next, we present and discuss the results of the multivariate analyses. The conclusions synthesise the main findings and their implications. The principal aim of this paper is to grasp the electoral logic of role formation, as a phenomenon that is distinct from socialisation and the constraints of political hierarchies.
Theoretical Framework and Main Variables
MPs can consider themselves as being agents of an indefinite number of principals, including gods, oligarchs or foreign countries, but the literature of the 'focus of representation' classically distinguishes between MPs oriented towards district, party, specific social group, or entire nation (or 'all citizens in the country'). The focus of representation is seen as a major aspect of the representative roles, alongside the style of representation.
When it first appeared in political science, the legislative role theory was part of the structural-functionalist paradigm. As a consequence, its conceptual frame applied mainly to entire legislative bodies and largely ignored the preferences and choices of individuals. The theory had a prominent normative dimension: roles were seen as norms of conduct to be internalised by all actors. This internalisation would happen primarily through socialisation (Saalfeld & Müller, 1997, pp. 2 -9; Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, & Ferguson, 1962) .
The concept of purposive roles (Jewell, 1983; Wahlke et al., 1962, p. 12 ) constituted a shift away from this paradigm as it acknowledged the relevance of the MPs' subjective understandings. The idea was developed into either sociological or rational choice directions. Representing the first strand of research, Searing (1994) uncovered, with the help of in-depth interviews, the actual roles representatives were undertaking while in Westminster, in Whitehall and in the constituencies. For Searing it was crucial 'to free' politicians from the abstract categories imposed on them by researchers and to reveal the most salient personal reasons behind role choice. Searing argued that backbench MPs have particularly large freedom in choosing a role since they are unconstrained by the duties and normative expectations that come with parliamentary or ministerial office. Strøm (1997) considered valid the claim that roles are bounded by the interaction between institutional constraints and individual preferences, but he emphasised the teleological and strategic components of these attitudes in line with the dominant frame of rational choice neo-institutionalism. Accordingly, roles are strategies chosen by politicians to reach the predefined goals of re-selection, re-election, party office and parliamentary office, and they are shaped by institutional rules (Strøm, 1997, pp. 162 -163) .
All the frameworks discussed so far, even Strøm's, with its focus on re-election and on underpinning institutions, ignore a number of factors relevant for the electoral process. The type of candidature of the MP, the manner in which he or she campaigned and, finally, the outcome of the election, may all contribute to role formation. The present article takes these factors into consideration in the course of explaining the variance in the focus of representation. Style, that is, how independent-minded the representatives are vis-à-vis their voters and their parties, will also be included in the analysis but only 5 as part of the interpretation of the answers given to the focus question.
The dependent variable is captured by the survey question asking whether the MP primarily represents his or her own voters in the constituency, all citizens in the constituency, the party electorate at large, specific social groups, or all the citizens in the country. 6 The question did not allow the respondents to choose more than one category. Since only a few respondents opted for the 'own voters in the constituency' and the 'specific social group' categories, the former was merged with the 'all citizens in the constituency' (to produce the category 'constituency'), while the latter was left out of the analysis.
The principal independent variables are related to the electoral context. The literature is divided as far as the role of electoral systems is concerned. The majority of the studies (Carey & Shugart, 1995; Crisp et al., 2004 ) assume or document a link between the way the MPs were elected, meaning whether they gained a territorially bounded seat or a party list seat and how they thought about their role as representatives. A significant minority finds no such link (Bogdanor, 1985; Mezey, 1979) . Those who report the influence of electoral rules most typically conclude that SMD-based elections strengthen the constituency focus -that is, choosing the electoral district as one's principal (Carey & Shugart, 1995; Katz, 1997) . SMD candidates have also been shown to make more contact with citizens (Curtice & Shively, 2000) , although Studlar and McAllister (1996) argued that the constituency work is shaped primarily by role perception, and the latter does not depend on the route to the legislature.
The obvious problem of contrasting attitudes of MPs operating under various electoral rules is that the differences can be attributed to a host of factors besides the nature of the seat. One way to solve the problem is to examine mixed systems and contrast the list MPs with the district MPs, exploiting the quasi-experimental nature of such cases (Shugart & Wattenberg, 2001; Zittel & Gschwend, 2008) . The typical finding of such studies is that in mixed systems the SMD candidate will be more constituency-oriented (Bawn & Thies, 2003; Gallagher & Holliday, 2003) .
The rationale for which one expects a difference between district-bound and non-district-bound MPs is almost taken for granted in the literature. In fact there can be multiple logics at work. On the one hand different types of seat come with different expectations from the environment, fellow politicians, party leaders and voters. The 'type of seat' variable above is supposed to tap these expectations. The environmental expectations emerge once the seat is occupied. The phenomenon follows a parliamentary logic to the extent that it entails a division of labour between SMD and list politicians within the parliaments.
Electoral rules, however, shape not only the type of seat but also the type of candidacy. The role of parties in controlling the nomination of the candidates and in supporting their campaigns differs across electoral channels, with the result that candidates experience campaigns differently. Following this logic Lundberg (2002) argued that roles depend on where a candidate ran and where he plans to run, and not where he won the seat.
Under certain electoral rules candidates are left largely on their own to win the seat, while in the opposite extreme a candidate's success depends entirely on the party's success. In systems where 'dual candidacy' exists, locally popular candidates may think of themselves as possible ambassadors of their district, while weaker ones have this option less, and therefore may turn to the party as their only saviour. Accordingly, Zittel (2009) found that hopeless candidates are in general more party-than district-focused.
Once the MPs occupy their seat, they become part of a large-scale and influential organisation, and it is reasonable to assume that their status within the parliament will shape how they think about their representative role. First, the work experience of high-ranking office holders is specific. They deal with (inter)-national issues and parliamentary procedures and therefore they must have less time to spend on district-related matters. Their chance of getting leading non-parliamentary political roles is also higher. In the arena-type legislatures (and our cases belong to this category, cf. Olson & Norton, 2007) receiving a parliamentary office is an honour bestowed on the politician by the party leaders, seniority being of secondary relevance. As a result, the expectation is that high status MPs will see themselves as party representatives. This tendency may be somewhat tempered by the fact that higher office may also give these MPs more possibility to channel resources to their district and therefore they may be much sought after actors in local politics as well.
Similar logic applies to the status within the party. In this case identification with the party has an even more straightforward rationale, and the time-related constraints of local activities together with the possibility of gaining high national offices such as prime-ministership should apply even more.
High party office may reflect the degree of socialisation within the party (Heitshusen, Young, & Wood, 2005; Zittel, 2009 ), but the length of party membership is probably an even more accurate indicator of socialisation. Newly coopted members may have a less deep attachment to the party and thus may concentrate on representing the interest of a particular constituency or of all the citizens in the country. In the rather different context of the European Parliament elections, party membership duration proved to enhance the party focus of the delegates (Weßels & Giebler, 2011, p. 17) . On the other hand, the opposite relationship cannot be ruled out either: newcomers may feel particularly under pressure to prove their loyalty to the party.
Following the logic of the factors listed above, position in local politics (Norris, 1997, pp. 33-34) and local origin (Tavits, 2010) was also shown to have an impact on representative roles. Those who cumulate the parliamentary mandate and a local office (for example, mayor, as it is possible in Hungary) continue to be exposed to local demands and expectations. Moreover, previous experience in local politics can have a similar effect. Thus, spending years dealing with local affairs may socialise the candidates into a district focus.
One would expect MPs who lack local politics experience to eschew the district principal and embrace the party logic.
Next to the status in party and institutional hierarchies, the ideological distance between MPs and their party may also influence their role perceptions (Zittel & Gschwend, 2008) . If MPs see considerable distance between themselves and the party mainstream they may be reluctant to regard the party as their principal. On the other hand, genuinely district-focused candidates may have very little interest in ideological matters. Therefore, when they are asked about their own left -right position they may simply reproduce the position of the party, thereby creating a positive correlation between district focus and ideological proximity.
Finally, in larger parliamentary parties there is room for more division of labour (Heidar & Koole, 2000) . As a result, backbenchers will have more time to concentrate on the needs of their constituencies than their counterparts in smaller parties. Members of the latter group often need to focus on representing their parties' interests in various parliamentary committees. MPs of large parties are also more credible in promising support for local development. These considerations imply a positive association between party size and constituency focus. On the other hand, politicians in large parties are also well-placed to develop a national focus since they are the ones who can actually shape national policies, and therefore one may expect many to embrace the country as the focus of representation. Given that in Hungary the electoral system was 20 years old, while in Romania it was introduced only two years before the empirical study, the size of parties was expected to have a more radically different profile in the former country.
The Operationalisation of the Explanatory Variables
The variables above are captured through largely identical indicators in the two countries, but there are some differences between the Romanian and the Hungarian cases, either due to data availability or due to theoretical considerations. As far as the nature of seats is concerned one must take into consideration that Hungary has three tiers: SMD, county list and national list. The three options can be ordered into an ordinal list in terms of how much they bind the MPs to specific geographical regions. The Romanian case is somewhat more difficult to interpret. Every MP is formally tied to an SMD, but the media and the general public often treat those MPs who finished first in their electoral contests (who actually 'won' the contest) differently from those who were second, third, or fourth. Seats will therefore be divided into those won by plurality or absolute majority, 7 and those won by fewer votes. The expectation is straightforward: the less the seat is associated with a particular territory, the more the MP will focus on the party (and maybe on the nation) and the less on the district. Given that in Romania the differences between seats are more amorphous than in Hungary, we expect a greater impact in the latter country.
As far as the type of candidacy is concerned, in Hungary it is possible to group the MPs into two large blocs: those who were nominated only as list candidates and those who were also competing in SMDs. In the Romanian case 'list candidature' was not an option, but the candidates could generally anticipate whether they had a better chance of being elected as the winners of an SMD or as beneficiaries of the performance of their party. Two types of indicator were available for this strategic calculation. First, the local elections that took place five months prior to the parliamentary elections provided up-to-date information on the strongholds of the parties. Second, each candidate had information about the likelihood of winning a party mandate based on the size of the population living in the SMD in which he/she ran. The variance in population size matters because in the first phase of the allocation of non-directly won mandates, the candidates of a party in a specific county compete against each other based on the raw number of votes they received and not on the corresponding percentages (Chiru & Ciobanu, 2009) . Therefore, we operationalise the 'type of candidacy' in Romania by using the population rank of the SMD in which the MP ran, standardised with respect to the number of SMDs in that county. In order to produce an ordinal variable the resulting figures were divided into quartiles.
We hypothesise that candidates nominated in the more densely inhabited SMDs will exhibit a more partisan profile, just like the Hungarian list candidates. The general expectation concerning candidacy is that party-dependent candidates (list candidates in Hungary and candidates nominated in districts where the likelihood of party mandates was high in Romania) will be party-focused.
One can try to differentiate between the impact of seats versus candidacy not only by entering both variables into a regression analysis, but also by examining politicians who ended up with a non-district seat but who originally ran as SMD candidates. In Hungary such politicians were found to engage more in constituency service and introduce more parliamentary questions on local issues than the list candidates (Montgomery, 1999, p. 514) . In Hungary the operationalisation is easy: list MPs who originally ran in SMDs versus all the other MPs. In Romania we contrast MPs who had to enter the parliament via the party back door in spite of the fact that they were strong candidates. The latter is operationalised as receiving more than 25 per cent of the vote.
If it turns out that the Hungarian MPs who ran in SMD districts but obtained list seats and the Romanian MPs who received their seat via redistribution, in spite of the considerable amount of support, are just as district-focused as those who possess SMD seats, then we can conclude that the electoral logic is more relevant than the type of the seat.
Above we assumed that candidacy should matter because it entails different types of campaigning, particularly as far as party dependency versus personality focus is concerned. The assumption is plausible, but an examination of the association between campaign style and candidacy status would strengthen our confidence. Fortunately, in the Hungarian case it is possible to gauge more specifically the nature of the campaign. The survey included a battery of questions about how localised, how intensive and how person-centred (as opposed to party-centred) the campaign was. One question specifically asked the MPs whether their campaign aimed at attracting the most attention to their party (zero) or to themselves (10).
The rest of the variables have simpler operationalisation (see Appendix, Tables A1 and A2 ). Parliamentary office is represented by a dummy variable: no office or office at House or committee level. Our 'party office' variable indicates two aspects: whether the MP has ever had a leadership position in their party and the highest level attained: local, regional or national. The length of party membership is measured through four perfectly even intervals (quartiles). The variable capturing local politics experience has three categories and it reflects number of years spent as mayor, deputy of the local government or deputy of the county government. The ideological distance between the MP and his party computes the absolute difference between his self-placement on a 0 -10 left -right scale and the mean of the scores assigned to the party by all the respondents belonging to the respective party, on the same scale. All distance scores were re-coded into quartiles so as to avoid empty cell problems when running the multivariate analyses. For party size a dummy variable is used, differentiating large parties, Fidesz, MSZP, PSD and PDL, from the rest of the parties. With the partial exception of the PDL, these were the largest parties for most of the post-1989 period.
The Dependent Variable
As Table 1 shows, the parliamentary elites of the two countries have rather different representation roles. Hungarian MPs are more constituency-and countryfocused, and less party-oriented. The party focus of Romanian MPs may largely be due to the fact that the country spent five electoral cycles under closed list proportional representation. One could also speculate that the variation is triggered by the difference in demand for constituency service in the two countries. However, this does not seem to be a plausible explanation given that the 2008 Romanian electoral reform was inspired precisely by the demand for more constituency service (Chiru & Ciobanu, 2009 ). One may wonder, of course, how valid these answers were. Are not MPs all partisans, after all? Indeed, just as in most European countries, in Hungary and Romania the legislatures are ruled by parties, displaying high rates of voting cohesion (Gherghina & Chiru, 2014; Ilonszki, 2000) . Surely, roll call votes may be misleading as the relevance of diverging roles may materialise in other activities such as lobbying, committee work, policy design, constituency work or intra-party politics. Nevertheless, before moving to the causal analysis it is important to demonstrate that the answers to the focus of representation question tap consequential attitudes and that the correlates of this question follow theoretical expectations.
Fortunately, both studies asked the MPs the following question: whose opinion should prevail in case of divergence, the party's or one's own? In the Hungarian case a second question followed, one that opposed one's own opinion with that of the voters. The Romanian survey contained questions on the ranking of constituency work versus plenary activities. These questions can help us to establish the validity of the dependent variable. Constituency focus should go together with valuing the opinion of the voters but not the opinion of the party, and appreciating constituency service more than the plenary activities. Party focus can be expected to characterise those who are ready to yield to the will of the party. As far as the third category, country focus, is concerned, the expectations are less crystallised. Considering the entire nation as one's principal fits nicely the ideal-typical Burkean trustee, although one may also regard him/ herself as the delegate of a nation with a united political will. As the first option sounds more plausible, we expect that country focus will go together with valuing one's own opinion both above the will of the party or of the voters, and focusing on plenary activities as opposed to constituency service. Table 2 reports the results of Bonferroni post hoc pairwise comparisons (based on differences in means). One unexpected finding stands out: partyfocused representatives in Romania are particularly likely to perceive constituency service as a salient activity. Otherwise the results point in the expected direction, although not all relationships are significant. District focus indeed implies MPs having a bottom-up orientation: they give more weight to the preferences of the voters than to their own opinion, disparage plenary activities and reject party rule (the latter does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance). Party-focused MPs from both countries seem to regard their personal opinion to be much less consequential than the MPs exhibiting other foci. Country focus indeed implies a trustee perception of oneself: those who see the entire nation as their principal take the liberty of going against not only the party but also against the voters. Moreover, their activity is indeed concentrated on the parliament (plenary work) as opposed to constituency service. While the relationship between focus and various other role-related attitudes is not particularly tight, the validation exercise can be considered successful: the choice of different principals triggers, or at least is related to, meaningfully different attitudes.
Analysis

Multivariate Explanations
In order to find out the net effect of the independent variables we entered them into a regression analysis. Because the dependent variable is nominal and has three categories the method deployed was a multinomial logistic regression (Long & Freese, 2006) . The interpretation of the results considers the relative risk ratios, not the raw estimates. The base outcome is always party focus. Variance inflation factor tests showed that multicollinearity was not a problem for any of the following models.
The Hungarian results (Table 3) confirm that the more territorially bound a seat is the more constituency-focused and less party-focused the MP becomes. Thus, receiving the mandate on the basis of an SMD victory as opposed to being elected from a county list increases by more than three times the likelihood of assuming a constituency focus compared to a party focus.
Candidacy type is also a significant predictor, and its effect is somewhat larger than that of seat type. Thus, compared with those who participate solely as list candidates, politicians who also run in SMDs are 4.6 times more likely to exhibit a constituency focus. Members of larger parties were less party-and more district-oriented. Ideological distance from the party enhances the partisan focus. Finally, a longer membership record increases the odds of displaying a party focus, although the effect is not particularly large: a move from the smallest quartile to the second smallest quartile doubles the likelihood for a party focus. Thus, the old guard seems indeed to be better socialised into party norms. Neither the type of seat nor the type of candidacy mattered for the country versus party dilemma. Actually, the only variable that makes a difference is party membership: a longer record facilitates a partisan focus, as opposed to a country focus. A switch from the smallest quartile to the second smallest quartile of length of party membership makes the Hungarian MPs 2.4 times more likely to embrace a party-focused representation role. In a model not shown here we replaced the type of seat variable with two dummies ('SMD-elected' and 'Elected from county list') and the effects did not change significantly. 9 We therefore chose to keep the more parsimonious model.
In line with our expectations, Romanian MPs who as candidates had a higher chance of winning a mandate due to the redistribution of party votes (that is, a party-dependent type of candidacy) were more likely to embrace a party focus compared to a constituency orientation. More precisely, a switch from the smallest quartile to the second smallest quartile of SMD population size increased by 1.5 times the likelihood of a party focus. Candidates who won their SMDs by plurality or majority seem three times more likely to exhibit a party focus as opposed to a country focus. One effect that goes against our hypothesis is that of local politics experience: those MPs who have spent more time in local politics appear less likely to declare a constituency focus compared to a party focus. One possible explanation could be that these politicians do not need to worry too much about the district as they can rely on past record of service and on their connections with local politicians and citizens. Again, similarly to Hungary, higher ideological deviance leads to more party focus, as opposed to country focus, while belonging to a large party inspired country focus (Table 4) .
Holding parliamentary or party office did not have an effect either in Romania or in Hungary. Ideological distance from the party, on the other hand, turned out to matter in both contexts. For both Hungarian and Romanian MPs an increase in ideological distance (from the smallest quartile to the second smallest quartile) raises by one and a half times the likelihood of assuming a party focus compared with the district and country alternatives, respectively. This finding goes against the literature-based expectations. The most plausible explanation is that 'constituency men' are non-ideological and therefore place themselves close to the party position. Those who position themselves differently may do so because they are more ideologically minded, and a preference for party focus may characterise the ideologically minded even if they are outliers in their own party. Generally, being a member of a large party 10 works against a party-oriented role. The effect of the variable is extremely large in Hungary: MPs of the large parties are 29 times more likely to be constituency-oriented. Members of the Romanian large parties are three times more likely to display a national focus than to be party-oriented.
Candidacy as Campaign Experience
As discussed above, we expected candidacy type to make a difference primarily due to the different campaign experience. Fortunately in Hungary, where the study was run immediately after the parliamentary elections, a number of questions referred directly to the campaign, and therefore this assumption can be investigated. The analysis of these questions (not presented here due to space limitations) shows that those candidates who canvassed more, organised more rallies in their district, advertised more intensively in local media, and relied more on their personal campaign team in organising local social events indeed tended to adopt a constituency focus. The constituency-focused candidates were most likely to issue personal posters, buy advertising space in local newspapers and in local electronic media, hold surgeries and publish personal flyers, focus on local issues that were not raised by the party, have their own website and have their own personal campaign team. The Hungarian candidates who had a candidate-centred 'campaign norm' (Zittel & Gschwend, 2008) opted, as MPs, for a constituency focus, almost without exception.
Seat versus Candidacy
Finally, we examine the relative influence of the nature of seat and the candidacy type on focus by looking at the attitudes of MPs who could be most torn apart by these two logics. For Hungary, we contrasted with the rest of the MPs, politicians who gained a list seat although they had also run in an SMD (57 MPs). The Cramer's V coefficient showed a moderate association: 0.277 * , the analysed group turned out to be significantly more country-and party-oriented than the rest of the MPs. Only about a quarter (24.6 per cent) of them were constituency-focused. This result confirms Papp (2011) , who found that the type of seat is more relevant than the type of candidacy.
In the Romanian case we examined those MPs who failed to gain the plurality of votes but were relatively popular, gaining more than a quarter of votes. Similarly to Hungary, only one of the 13 MPs in this category assumed a constituency representational role, whereas eight of his colleagues declared a party focus. Table 5 confirms the previous findings with different coefficients. Hungarian SMD-losers ended up with a pronounced preference for party focus and with the rejection of district focus. The Romanian MPs in this group also disparaged the district principal. Apparently the district-focused campaign experience has not socialised the politicians into a district focus; after learning that they had lost the district seat, they gave up on the local constituencies.
Conclusions
In the literature of representational roles, the attitudes of politicians are typically explained by their hierarchical positions, and their embeddedness in the party or in local politics. Most of the debates concern the question of whether these features indicate different ambitions, resources or socialisation. In this regard the current study has a negative message, although admittedly limited in terms of the scope for generalisation: these factors do not count for much. The only good news for socialisation theories is that in Hungary length of membership proved to function in the predicted way: it increased party focus.
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Party size played a role in both countries. The dramatically strong effect in Hungary may be due to the two decades of experience with an electoral system that has taught actors that only candidates of large parties can have a chance of becoming SMD representatives. This stability of the electoral rules was matched by a relative stability of party sizes. Under such circumstances a division of labour may develop between parties within which it becomes the job of the large parties to think in terms of districts.
Higher ideological distance from the party encouraged partisan focus in both countries. In line with the discussion above, our tentative explanation is that in order to be ideologically deviant first you need to be ideological, and the chances of this are smaller if you focus on your district.
The Hungarian study, conducted immediately after the elections, allowed us to illustrate that the various organisational aspects of campaigning are related to the focus of representation. The Romanian study, completed two years after elections, showed that focus makes a difference in terms of prioritising constituency service versus parliamentary activities, and it does so in a theoretically meaningful way. These relationships and the items on how an MP should behave if in conflict with the party or with the voters indicated that the focus question has validity: choosing the district as boss means to be constituencyfocused and to follow a delegate style, choosing the party implies readiness to accept party discipline, while choosing country indicates a trustee-like role perception.
In both countries the nature of seats (how territorially bounded they are) was related to the focus of representation as expected: the stronger the association, the less likely the development of a party focus (in Hungary) or country focus (in Romania). The rather large impact of this variable in Romania supports one of the most important findings of the study: the political environment can have almost as much impact on the type of representation as the formal rules.
Similarly, in both countries candidacy type was a significant predictor of the focus of representation as far as the party versus district dichotomy is concerned: those candidates who were more dependent on the party for their election were much more likely to assume a partisan focus.
Perhaps the most novel finding of the present study is that serious contenders for SMD seats who end up gaining the mandate thanks to the party become particularly partisan in their role perception. Campaign circumstances may influence the self-image of the MPs, but a frustrating SMD campaign may actually 'counter-socialise' the candidates, turning the would-be district ambassadors into committed party delegates.
The study has highlighted the relevance of the incentives produced by electoral systems, but also the subtle differences that exist between the electoral and the post-electoral logics of parliamentary politics. As did Searing (1994) , we note the relevance of position roles, but unlike him we do not find them related to a frontbench -backbench dichotomy but to the expectations of the environment that come with the job. In line with Strøm (1997) , the article has documented the role of institutional constraints, but, contrary to him, has drawn attention to informal institutions, the expectations of the environment, and opened up the explanatory models towards the inclusion of psychological reactions, namely frustration.
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